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AM-HAWAIIAN S. S. CO. V. CAL. EMP. COM. 
"V I" 
[24 C.2d 
caprice to defeat that purpose by merely failing to make the 
payments or by the action of the commission in setting aside 
the referee's affirmance of the initial allowance. Certainly 
the Legislature did not intend that the main, and as expressed 
in the Abelleira case, the most important part of the act 
should rest upon such a precarious basis. Second, the bene-
fits must be paid "regardless of any appeal." That phrase 
clearly embraces the decision on appeal. Paraphrasing, it 
would read that the benefits are payable regardless of a re-
vorsal on appeal. In other words there was an absolute 
obligation to pay, and the Legislature chose to assume the 
risk of error by the referee. (AbeUeira v. District Court of 
Appeal, supra.) Third, the above discussed rule of statu-
tory construction applies, namely, that the only limitation 
attached to the payment was in respect to the employer's 
account. The expression of that condition eliminates others 
and others may not bc added by judicial construction. 
From what I have said in the foregoing opinion, it follows 
that the employees here involved were entitled to unemploy-
ment insurance benefits from the date of the affirmance of 
the award in their favor by the referee and that such bene-
fits should be paid until the final determination by this court 
that they were not entitled thereto. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
(S. F. No. 16838. In Bank. Aug. 18, 1944.) 
AMERICAN-HAWAIIAN STEAMSHIP COMP ANY (a 
Corporation) et al., Petitioners, v. CALIFORNIA 
EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION et al., Respondents; 
JAMES DUGGAR et al., Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Unemployment Relief - Disqualification - Leaving Work Be-
cause of Trade Dispute.-Dock checkers who went on strike 
[1] See 11 Ca1.Jur. Ten-year Supp. (Pocket Part), "Unemploy-
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Unemployment Relief. 
ment Reserves and Social Security." 
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against employers operating terminal facilities for transport-
ing freight by water and who refused to work for them during 
the strike left their work because of a trade dispute within 
Unemployment Insurance Act, § 56(a) (Stats. 1935, ch. 352: 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d), and were precluded by that 
section from receiving benefit payments for unemployment 
during the strike, although at the beginning of the strike they 
were either not working on any assignment or were working 
for employers not subject to the strike. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel the California Em-
ployment Commission to vacate an order awarding benefit 
payments and to refrain from charging petitioners' accounts 
,with such payments. Writ granted. 
Brobeck, Phlcger & Harrison and Gregory A. Harrison f01" 
Petitioners. 
Earl Warren, Attorney General, Robert W. Kenny, Attor-
ney General, John J. Dailey, Deputy Attorney General, Mau-
rice P. McCaffrey, Glenn V. Walls, Ralph R. Plante en, Charles 
P. Scully, Forrest M. Hill, Gladstein, Grossman, Margolis & 
Sawyer, Ben Margolis, William Murrish, Gladstein, Gross-
man, Sawyer & Edises, Aubrey Grossman and Richard Glad-
stein for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On November 10, 1939, the Ship Clerks' 
Union, Local 1-34 of the International Longshoremen's and 
Warehousemen's Union, called a strike effective at 6 :00 p. m. 
on that day against employers who were members of the Dock-
checkers Employers' Association of San Francisco, because 
they could not agree upon the renewal terms of collective bar-
gaining agreements that had expired on September 30, 1939. 
The strike continued until January 3, 1940, when it was termi-
nated by agreement of the parties. The Dock-Checkers' Em-
ployers' Association, now part of the Waterfront Employers' 
Association of San Francisco, represented its members, who 
operate terminal facilities for freight transported by water 
to and from ports on San Francisco Bay, in their collective 
bargaining with the Ship Clerks' Union. The employment 
arrangement, similar to that for the longshoremen, was estab-
lished under a contract executed on March 30, 1937, between 
the checkers' union and the employers' association. By agree-
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ment the parties were continuing to operate under this ~oii­
tract at the time of the strike. The union and the employers' 
association operated jointly a hiring hall from which checkers 
were dispatched as employers called for them. There are 
several classes of checkers: (1) monthly checkers, who work 
for only one company and are paid a monthly salary; (2) pre-
ferreddaily checkers, who work for only one company so long 
as their services are needed and are paid on an hourly basis 
but who are allowed to work through the hiring hall as casual 
daily checkers if the company by which they are preferred has 
no work for them for more than a two-day period; (3) casual 
daily checkers, who are members of the union and are dis-
patched in rotation from the hiring hall to work on an hourly 
basis for various employers and who may work for a number 
of employers in anyone day; (4) permit checkers; who are not 
members of the checkers' union but are represented by it for 
collective bargaining purposes, and are dispatched through 
the hiring hall after the casual daily checkers' list is ex-
hausted. Workers are dispatched from the hiring hall in rota-
tion to equalize work opportunities. Upon finishing an assign-
ment the checker returns to the hiring hall to await assignment 
to a new job. I 
The present proceeding involves the CJlaims for unemploy.! 
ment insurance benefits for the period of the strike of 125 
casual daily checkers, preferred daily checkers whose status 
had become that of casual daily checkers, and permit check-
ers, who went on It strike although they were either not work-
ing upon any a..~signment at 6 :00 p. m. on November 10, 
1939, or were working at that time for employers who were 
not members of the association and not subject to the strike. 
Workers in the latter classification. continued to work until 
their job assignments were completed. All of the claimants' 
refused to work during the strike for any of the members of I 
the employers' association against whom the strike was called.: 
The claims were denied by the adjustment unit of the; 
Division of Unemployment Insurance, but the referee granted. 
them upon the ground that claimants did not leave theil' 
work because of a trade disputc within the mcaning of sec-
tion 56 (a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act. (Stats. 
1935, ch. 352, as amended; Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 8780d.~1 
The commission affirmed the award, with two members dis-
senting. The employers thereupon petitioned the District 
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Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, for 
Ii writ of mandamus to compel the commission to vacate its 
order awarding benefit payments and to refrain from charg-
ing their accounts with such payments. That court issued 
the writ and this court granted a hearing at the request of 
the commission and of the claimants who intervened in the 
proceeding. By stipulation the case was submitted on the 
record of the proceedings before the commission with . the 
reservation of the right to try the question before the court 
whether the parties should have the right to try the case 
de novo, but the question as to that right was not argued. 
[1] Since the claimants went on a strike against peti-
tioners and refused' to work for them during the strike, they 
left their work because of a trade dispute within the mean-
ing of section 56 (a) of the California Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, supra, and are precluded by that section from 
receiving benefit payments for unemployment during the 
period of the strike. (Matson Terminals, Inc. v. Oalifornia 
Employment Oommission, ante, p. 695 [151 P.2d 202].) 
The contention that petitioners have not exhausted their ad-
ministrative and legal remedies under section 41.1 of the act 
is answered adversely in Matson Terminals, Inc., v. Oalifor-
nia Employment Oommission, supra, and the contention that 
the court is without power in this proceeding in mandamus 
,to review the decision of the commission is answered adversely 
in Bodinson ManUfacturing 00. v. Oalifornia Employment 
Oommission, 17 Ca1.2d 321, 328-330 [109 P .2d 935]. 
Let a peremptory writ issue as prayed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis,' J., and Edmonds, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached for the 
reason that the unemployment occurred after the effective 
, date of the 1939 amendment to section 67 of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act. 
In' this case the initial determination by the adjustment 
. unit denied unemployment benefits. Although that denial was 
. reversed by the referee and benefits allowed and the latter 
. order affirmed by the commission, benefits were not pay-
,able regardless of the appeal because section 67 of the Cali-
fornia Unemployment Insurance Act as it read in 1939 
720 W. R. GRACE & CO. V. CAL. EMP. COM. [24 C.2d 
(Stats. 1939, ch. 1085) required that payments be madE.' 
where the referee affirmed "an initial determination allow-
ing benefits." In 1937 it provided that if a referee affirms 
a decision of a deputy or' the commission affirms a decision 
of the referee allowing benefits, the benefits must be paid 
regardless of the appeal. (Stats. 1937, p. 2059.) (See dis. 
senting opinion in W. R. Grace (~ Co. v. California Emp. 
Com., this day filed post, p. 734 [151 P.2d 223].) 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Interveners' petition for a rehearing was denied September 
13, 1944. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., voted for a rehearing. 
[So F. No. 16839. In Bank. Aug. 18, 1944.] 
W. R. GRACE & COMPANY (a Corporation) et al., Peti-
tioners, V. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT COMMIS-
SION et aI., Respondents; FRANK ABELLEIRA et a1., 
Interveners and Respondents. 
[1] Mandamus-Defenses-Pendency of Another Action.-A writ 
of mandamus is not so exceptional in nature that it is never 
abated by the pendency of other litigation. Although it was 
originally a high prerogative writ to which the plea of another 
action pending was not available, it no longer depends on pre-
rogative power and is by statute expressly subject to the rules 
of practice applicable to other actions when there are no pro-
visions otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1109.) 
[2] Abatement - Pendency of Another Action - Mandamus Pro-
ceedings.-A writ of mandamus is denied if a similar applica-
tion between the same parties on the same matter is already 
pending before another court. The pendency of another action, 
[1] See 16 Cal.Jur. 763, 849; 34 Am.Jur. 811; 35 Am.Jur. 70. 
[2] Action or suit as abating mandamus proceeding or vice 
versa, note, 37 A.L.R. 1432. See, also, 1 Cal.Jur. 28, 31; 1 Am.Jur. 
31,40. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 75; [2] Abatement and 
Revival, §§ 17,19; [3-7,9-18] Unemployment Relief; [8] Statutes, 
§ 184. 
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however, is no defense unless it is "between the same parties 
for the same cause." (Code Civ. Proc., § 430(3).) 
[3] Unemployment Relief-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-
, Superior court actions brought under Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, § 45.10 (Stats. '1939, p. 2051; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
1939 Supp., Act 8780d), do not abate a mandamus proceeding 
in the Supreme Court to test the validity of the Employment 
Commission's decision that claimants are entitled to benefits 
of the act, where the parties are not the same, some employers 
and claimants in the mandamus proceeding not being involved 
in the other actions. Moreover, the two causes of action are 
not the same, an action under § 45.10 simply determining the 
propriety of the employer's contribution to the fund, whereas 
the mandamus proceeding is in effect an appeal to the courts 
from a determination under § 67. 
[4] ld.-Remedies of Employer-Action to Recover Protested Par-
ment.-No cause of action arises under Unemployment Insur-
ance Act, § 45.10 in relation to unemployment benefits unless 
they actually affect the amount of the employer'scontrlbution 
and he pays the increased amount under protest. 
[5] ld.-Remedies of Employer-Mandamus.-The fact that plain-
tiffs in actions to recover unemployment contributions paid 
under protest may seek to support their claims with proof 
identical to that introduced in a separate mandamus proceed-
ing to test the validity of an award of unemployment benefits, 
is insufficient as il. ground of abatement of the mandamus 
proceeding. 
[6] ld. - Remedies of Employer -.:.. Mandamus - Limitations.-A 
mandamus proceeding to compel the Employment Commission 
to vacate an award of unemployment benefits need not be 
commenced within the time prescribed for bringing an action 
under Unemployment Insurance Act, § 45.10 or § 41.1 to re-
cover contributions alleged to have been illegally assessed 
against an employer. The limitation periods prescribed in 
those statutes are not made applicable by Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1109, which specifies for mandamus proceedings only the 
limitation periods prescribed in part two of that code. 
[7] ld. - Remedies of Employer - Mandamus - Limitations and 
Laches.-Where the Employment Commission's decision grant-
ing unemployment benefits was not released until more than 
13 months from the time it was dated, and where a request 
for a rehearing was denied about two months later, a mandamus 
proceeding against the commission about 22 months after the 
date of said decision was within any applicable statute of 
limitations, and was not barred by laches. 
